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1. Theoretical models indicate that allowing a regulated company to introduce optional 
(or self selecting) tariffs can make individual consumers (and consumers on average) 
better off and be profitable for the company, as long as the original (regulated) tariff 
remains available to all consumers.  
2. The models contain some restrictive assumptions and limitations and may be difficult 
to apply in practice. 
3. One particular assumption crucial to the benefits is that consumers choose the best 
tariff for themselves. More recent research on consumer behaviour in general and in 
utilities in particular show that this may not be the case. Much of the market literature 
has been concerned with the telecoms and energy markets. 
4. There may be distributional concerns if some consumer groups are less likely to 
choose well, particularly if there are likely to be long term effects on the ‘base’ tariff. 
Such concerns are reflected in the current British energy regulator’s consultation on 
reducing tariff choice for both suppliers and consumers as a response to perceived 
failure of competition. This experience raises questions about the intrinsic value of 
choice for consumers.  
5. Experience of optional metering in England and Wales provides some evidence of 
how residential water consumers have responded to that particular tariff choice. 
Other evidence on water consumer perceptions indicates that the assumptions made 
in theoretical models of tariff choice may not be applicable to this market. This may 
affect the applicability of welfare assessments made in the models. 
6. We conclude by identifying some questions about the circumstances in which 
allowing optional tariffs (alongside a regulated base) is likely to be beneficial. 
                                                 
1 The Centre for Competition Policy was set up in 2004, with a grant from the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) to fund a ten-year research programme and explores competition policy, 
including market regulation from the perspective of economics, law, business and political science.  
 
 1. Optional tariffs can make consumers and companies better off, if the original 
tariff remains available to all consumers.  
The theory of allowing companies to offer tariffs in addition to a regulated price was 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s, before competition was widely introduced to the formerly 
regulated sectors and behavioural biases of consumers were considered in the general 
literature. The intuition is appealing, and presented in Willig’s 1978 article.  Several authors 
showed that allowing a firm to offer optional tariffs while still offering the original tariff could 
never be welfare decreasing if: 
 
Consumers know which tariff is best for them, so will never be worse off from the new option; 
Firms offer new tariffs only if it increases their profits. If these two conditions are satisfied, 
there can be no loss from the introduction of optional tariffs as an addition to the original in 
such a static setting. Note that if there is a feedback from the revenue received by 
companies to the prices they charge to all consumers in subsequent periods, these results 
will not necessarily hold. 
 
Optional tariffs are likely to be most beneficial for the firms if demand is very responsive to 
price changes. This can be illustrated by the example of introducing peak and off peak prices 
where there had been no previous differentiation between time of day/season. Peak prices 
are higher and off-peak prices lower than the uniform price, which continues to be available. 
Under the assumptions above, consumers will be by definition better off; but if consumers 
with high off-peak use move to the new tariff, while those with heavy peak consumption stay 
on the uniform tariff, the revenues for the company may fall. If it is up to the company 
whether or not to introduce such tariffs, then assuming it has reasonable knowledge of its 
own costs and its consumers’ demands, it will do so only if it is profitable for itself.  
Faulhaber and Panzar (1977) show that under any optimal set of self-selecting two part 
tariffs, the lowest usage charge is greater than marginal cost.  Adding another option will 
always bring the lowest usage charge closer to marginal cost and increase total surplus. 
Train (1991) confirms this result when the number of consumers is fixed (as is effectively the 
case in water) and consumers have some preferences for particular tariffs independently of 
the outlay they need to make (perhaps because of concerns about variation in bills).  
 
Much of the theoretical debate in the US was motivated by offering measured tariffs rather 
than flat rate for telecoms, an interesting analogy to the current UK water situation where, as 
discussed below, a choice of tariffs (measured or unmeasured) is already offered to most 
unmeasured customers. 
 
Focusing on  companies constrained by an average revenue constraint, Armstrong, Cowan 
and Vickers (1995) show that in a large number of cases, overall welfare will improve if a 
regulated firm is allowed to use non linear tariffs, and consumers have the option to continue 
consuming at the uniform price which maximised profit for given average revenue constraint. 
 
With average revenue regulation there might be a problem of the firm trying to increase 
profits within a revenue cap by serving low cost consumers and pricing high cost consumers 
out of the market (Bradley & Price, 1988), but this would be less likely with a tariff basket 
constraint (as applied to water companies) and a myopic firm which maximised profits. In 
practice, there is little evidence that companies responded to these incentives in the first 
decades of regulated privatisation (Giulietti & Waddams Price, 2005). 
 
Vogelsang (1990) adapts Sibley’s Incremental Surplus Scheme (ISS) for a regulated firm, 
and confirms that allowing the firm to offer any optional two part tariff will increase the total 
surplus, as long as consumers can still choose the original (regulated) tariff.  Consumers are 
assumed to maximise their utility, and so will never accept a tariff which leaves them worse 
off, and the firm will set marginal cost prices, with the original tariff acting as a kind of 
yardstick. Vogelsang points out that this is the most Pareto efficient outcome in a stationary 
environment, but raises some questions which are reproduced below.  The firm’s rents are 
equal to the initial profits plus net consumer surplus increases from optional tariffs; 
consumers as a whole neither gain nor lose; and the firm minimises costs and invests 
optimally.    
2. The models contain restrictive assumptions and limitations and may be 
difficult to apply in practice 
Train (1991) points out that some consumers may be hurt if the company in fact loses 
money – perhaps because it miscalculated costs or demand. In such a case the ‘standard’ 
tariff might have to rise in order to allow it sufficient revenue, and so it is no longer true that 
no consumer is worse off – those who don’t choose the option will be because their (default) 
tariff will change.  A more positive outcome might be that the introduction of the tariffs 
themselves may provide the regulator with additional information about the firm’s costs, and 
so enable more efficient regulation.  
 
Vogelsang (1990) raises a number of practical concerns about the introduction of optional 
tariffs which seem very relevant two decades later. First, he notes that consumer advocates 
generally do not support policy changes which make firms better off. Secondly, more tariffs 
increase the complexity of consumer choice, foreshadowing more widespread concerns 
about whether consumers always choose what is in their own best interests. And thirdly, 
there may be concern about degradation of quality, though it is unclear why this should be 
more of a problem with optional tariffs than with other forms of price cap regulation.  
 
If demand or cost changes in a way that is not initially predicted, winners and losers reflect 
the situation for price caps more generally: that is, cost changes are borne entirely by the 
firm, and might raise issues of viability; while consumers suffer surplus reductions from 
unforeseen demand decreases but benefit from increases. 
 
Li Ning and Willington (2009) analyse a regulated firm with a binding universal access 
constraint, which may be relevant to water.  They examine two different tariff schemes which 
supplement the approved regulated price. In the first scheme, the alternative tariffs must be 
available to all consumers; in the second, the firm can restrict access to the ‘alternative’ tariff.  
The latter will maximise total surplus, but as the authors point out, it may be less desirable 
because of considerations of fairness; they confirm that allowing the firm to offer the choice 
of alternative tariffs to all consumers will improve the total welfare. Their paper underlines 
the importance of perceived equity between consumers. 
 
Panzar and Sidak (2006) identify some cases where allowing a regulated company to offer 
an optional tariff does not lead to an overall (Pareto) improvement.  The most relevant for the 
current situation is that there may not be an improvement if a firm is not a profit maximiser 
(for obvious reasons); and, as others have observed, optional tariffs may not work well if 
regulation provides a mechanism which means that allowed revenue decreases, so the 
regulated price is raised for others.  Equally if the firm’s revenue rises there may be good 
effects for other consumers through eventual (downward) revision of the base tariff.  
 
Miravete (2007) considers the cost to companies of introducing more complex/general tariffs, 
arising from underlying product development/marketing/commercialisation costs which may 
outweigh the small gains from introducing such tariffs. Basing his findings on the US cellular 
phone market he shows that adding tariff complexity does not dramatically increase profits 
beyond three tariff options, and that losses from using a two-part rather than a more multi-
part/fully non-linear tariff are very small. His analysis suggests that a single option (in 
addition to the original regulated price) would capture any potential net gains. 
 3. Consumers don’t always choose well for themselves.  
The work described above, and indeed most ‘standard’ economic analysis until recently, 
assumed consumers knew how to choose best for themselves. Given the importance of this 
assumption in the conclusion that optional tariffs are an improvement (because no consumer 
would choose it unless it was in their own best interests), some review of this assumption is 
appropriate in the light of recent developments in behavioural economics. A recent report for 
the Office of Fair Trading by Huck et al (2011) reviews findings from the general literature on 
consumer bias, including whether biased consumers may make ‘rational’ consumers better 
or worse off, in a general competitive rather than regulated context. 
 
These more recent challenges from the development of ‘behavioural’ literature and 
understanding about consumer choice raises questions about the basis of the original 
models; unfortunately, as in much behavioural work, the result is rather negative, with rarely 
clear guidance on the consequences of the biases and appropriate policy response.  
 
Like the theory, most of the relevant empirical evidence in regulated markets is based on the 
electricity and telecommunications sectors. The main precedents are in the introduction of 
optional time of day/seasonal tariffs in energy, and of usage rather than flat rate tariffs in 
telecommunications, a close parallel to the choice between measured and unmeasured 
supply in water.  
 
Miravete (2003) demonstrates that consumers can make ex post (as well as presumably ex 
ante) errors in tariff choice because they are unable to commit to usage. Miravete 
distinguishes between errors of choice of tariff where consumption is correctly anticipated, 
and errors in forecasting usage (which may affect the optimal tariff choices). Water 
consumption is likely to be more predictable in some dimensions than telephone usage, 
though some uses (such as garden watering) depend on weather. However learning can 
occur on both the company and consumer sides, so that consumers become more aware of 
their own usage over time, and so make better choices. 
 
At the same time, companies get a better idea of each consumer’s type and therefore can 
price discriminate better (i.e. offer more tailored tariff choices from which the customer can 
self-select) and extract more of the consumers’ surplus. Both benefits and downsides (from 
the consumer surplus/regulator’s perspective) may increase over time, rather than 
necessarily be immediately realised. 
Miravete’s telecoms tariff experiment shows no evidence of a flat rate bias, found commonly 
in the behavioural literature, and suggests that in general consumers do make the correct 
choices for themselves based on realized usage. There are two parts to this choice: 
consumers’ ability to predict their usage; and, secondly, their ability to make the correct 
choice based on their predicted usage. The benefit of field experiments, such as Miravete 
reports, is the abstraction from tariff complexity: there are only two tariffs to choose from – 
one fixed, one which has a fixed element up to a certain degree of usage. Risk aversion is 
also minimized as potential losses are small. 
 
Miravete and Palacios-Huerta (2009) explore the evidence from one tariff field experiment on 
the attentiveness of consumers, something which is very difficult to test realistically in 
laboratory experiments. The situation mirrors some water metering choices, as consumers 
are given the option of a multi-part tariff (fixed fee, inclusive allowance plus per usage 
charge once the allowance threshold reached) or a flat rate tariff as previously. They find 
that the level of consumer attentiveness is high and that participants respond to small 
potential savings ($5-6 per month); although consumers do make mistakes, these are not 
systematic. However, those who face more complex decisions learn more slowly and make 
more mistakes. No evidence of time-inconsistent choices or impulsiveness is found. 
 
Tariff-choice biases are explored directly by Lambrecht and Skiera (2006), in particular any 
preference for flat rate fees or pay-per-use tariffs bias. The bases of each kind of tariff are 
explored. A flat rate bias can arise from an insurance effect where the consumer’s risk 
aversion generates a preference for a predictable bill. A related aversion to loss may lead 
them to prefer a flat rate bill even if the average payment is higher. Other factors contributing 
to a flat rate bias may include a ‘taxi-meter’ effect where consumers enjoy non-metered 
usage more than metered usage. The flat fee “decouples consumption from payment”, in 
effect giving consumers positive pleasure from the zero marginal price of additional units. 
Consumers may also experience a convenience effect from the predictability of the bill.  
 
Lambrecht and Skiera also found an over-estimation effect, in which consumers consistently 
predict higher usage than they actually undertake, and so make ex post errors.  The 
research finds evidence that consumers pay a flat-rate specific premium, which they explain 
by the factors outlined above. 
 
Herweg and Mierendorff (2011) provide a theoretical model which develops many of 
Lambrecht and Skiera's propositions, confirming the three reasons for a flat rate bias. They 
emphasise three factors: the taxi-meter effect, suggesting that if payment is more salient, 
consumption is less enjoyable; the tendency for consumers to over-estimate their usage; 
and risk aversion. Since the risks are small, they focus on loss aversion and consumers’ 
wish to avoid even small deviations from reference point. 
The National Billmonitor mobile report 2011 provides support for Lambrecht and Skiera's  
findings that flat rate bias is more prevalent than pay per use bias. 52% of the customers in 
their sample were on a tariff that was optimal for larger usage than theirs, whilst only 29% 
were on a tariff that was optimal for smaller levels of consumption. Three reasons are 
proposed for such bias. First, risk aversion which leads to tariff complacency and “bill shock”. 
Secondly, the complexity and limitations of contract choices for a given handset which drive 
consumers to simpler tariffs. And thirdly, failure of customers to take advantage of the ability 
to change tariff “mid-contract”. Many do not appreciate the fact that it is easier to increase 
than decrease the size of a contract during the contract term, so that picking a smaller 
package to start with may offer more options for later adjustments. 
 
Evidence from the energy market suggests that consumers’ knowledge of their current 
consumption is skewed towards the average (Mathieu and Waddams Price, 2005). Those 
with low consumption show an upward bias in their estimates, while those with above 
average consumption tend to think that it is lower. This may result from publicity about 
energy bills which focuses on the average bill, which then becomes a familiar reference. 
 
Whatever the consumer biases, about their own demand, companies will generally respond 
to them, so that inefficiencies will be generated when the true demand is realised. If 
consumers overestimate their demand, companies will wish to charge them for the higher 
estimate but deliver only the actual demand, suggesting a preference on companies’ side for 
a high upfront (flat rate) fee with a lower marginal charge. Where consumers underestimate 
their own demand, companies can profit by charging more for the later higher demand. For 
such consumers a company would want to set a low initial flat rate fee with high marginal 
charges. Though most of the literature on consumer biases applies to markets where there 
is some competition, the basic intuition should transfer to the regulated setting.  
 
Grubb (2009) shows how companies can use three part tariffs to extract rents from 
consumers who overestimate the precision of their demand forecasts. Such tariffs are based 
on three characteristics. First, the flat rate bias of consumers arising from demand 
overestimate, the taxi-meter effect and risk aversion. Second, demand underestimate which 
arises from quasi-hyperbolic discounting (a stronger preference for today over tomorrow 
than for tomorrow over the day after). And thirdly, monopoly price discrimination. This latter, 
of course, could be controlled at least to some extent within a monopoly setting. 
 
Empirical studies show some evidence of consumer errors in choosing the best tariffs. 
Conlin et al. (2007) report some projection bias in the field, using catalogue sales and 
returns data. Some consumers overestimate the extent to which their tastes will remain 
constant, and so do not allow for potential changes in their future demand. 
 
Wilson and Waddams Price (2010) find persistent consumer errors in choosing between 
different energy suppliers; while this is in a competitive context, it has parallels with the water 
market in that different suppliers each offered a single two part tariff of different structure (as 
well as different level) for a homogeneous good. Even among consumers who were 
switching only to save money, around one fifth ended up on a more expensive tariff for their 
level of consumption. They found little evidence that any particular demographic or socio-
economic group made worse decisions than others. 
4. There may be distributional concerns if some consumer groups are less likely 
to choose well, reflected in the Energy regulator’s restriction of tariff choices.  
While the academic papers cited above found no evidence that particular household groups 
were more prone to bias than others, the energy regulator, Ofgem has found some 
consistent patterns of behaviour in the energy market, particularly in the choice between 
different suppliers. As noted above, this is similar to a tariff choice, since tariff differences are 
both the main distinction between different suppliers, and price2 is the main motivation for 
switching, and features heavily in marketing campaigns. Ofgem (2008) found in its Energy 
Supply Probe that while all households groups switched supplier, the rate of switching was 
slightly lower amongst groups which might be considered vulnerable, including some for 
whom the regulator had statutory responsibility. Thus those over 65 and living in rural areas3 
were less likely to switch supplier, and analysis of data shows that switching rates among 
these groups are statistically significantly lower (though by a small margin in most cases) 
than for consumers as a whole (Chang and Waddams Price, 2008). Switching rates are also 
lower amongst those with lower educational achievements and who are in rented 
accommodation, despite the persistence until 2008 of a 10% saving from switching. The 
energy regulator was keen to encourage all groups to benefit financially from superior offers, 
and introduced a number of ways to help consumers make choices which would be better for 
themselves. In particular, Ofgem segmented consumers into two groups: those who actively 
make a decision to switch and those who do not. Around a fifth search actively for the best 
deals, and generally achieve one. This is the same proportion which Wilson and Waddams 
Price (2010) found achieved the best deal in their earlier work. About half of the other four 
fifths would switch supplier if actively approached; however such changes were often not in 
the consumers’ interests, since decisions are made with only partial information (usually 
information only about the offers available with the company who is canvassing) and under 
some sales persuasion. Following fines for mis-selling, three of the six major companies 
temporarily suspended doorstep selling in summer 2011. It will be interesting to see whether 
there is an impact on switching rates. 
 
In a subsequent review of the market (Ofgem, 2011) the regulator still found cause for 
concern because of the persistent lower switching rates amongst some consumer groups, 
and higher prices  and profits amongst suppliers. As a result they are consulting on further 
restricting the tariff options which companies can offer. In 2009 they imposed non 
                                                 
2 Quality of supply is determined by the monopoly distributor in each region, rather than the retailer. 
3 The lower availability of piped gas in rural areas probably explains this group’s lower switching rates, as 
they are less likely to be able to achieve savings compared to those who can take advantage of dual fuel 
offers. 
discrimination clauses on the companies which restricted their ability to offer lower tariffs out 
of their home region than within them. Unfortunately this is likely to have had an anti 
competitive effect (Hviid and Waddams Price, 2010), which seems to be confirmed by lower 
switching rates and higher profits. The regulator is now proposing not only that each supplier 
should offer a ‘default’ tariff which has a fixed element determined by the regulator, but that 
all other tariffs, which may be only temporary in nature, must also be expressed in terms of 
the same regulated fixed element and a single energy charge for some average consumer. 
Thus while the water regulator is considering allowing companies to offer consumers more 
choice, the energy regulator is consulting on restricting the tariff choices which companies 
may make to consumers. Of course some of the issues differ because of the choice of 
suppliers in energy, but the different approaches make an interesting contrast. 
5. Response of consumers to optional metering in England and Wales  
Characteristics of optants and non-optants  
A water company database with over 8000 observations provides some initial evidence on 
whether households saved money when opting for a meter. In addition, it provides 
information on some key characteristics of these households. Three types of household are 
contained in the database: 
1. optant metering 
2. change of occupancy metering (company-initiated metering) 
3. zonal metering (area-wide metering when water scarcity status is granted). 
 
Bill changes associated with metering categories 
When meters were installed, all categories of metered households saved money on their bill 
on average. However, numerical and statistically significant differences exist between the 
types of metered households. Specifically, optant households saved £115 per annum on 
average compared to just £37 for ‘change of occupancy’ households and £55 for ‘zonal’ 
households. A comparison between just ‘optant’ and ‘compulsory’ households (an 
amalgamation of categories 2 and 3 above) shows these groups saving £115 and £45 on 
average off their bills.4 The fact that optant households saved more money from their bill 
than both types of compulsory households suggests that on average, these household were 
able to make ‘rational’ choices about meter adoption. This evidence is encouraging in light of 
other evidence which suggests that water consumers have difficulty in engaging with 
particular aspects of their bill (see below). This compares to around £20 a year savings 
realised in 2000 and 2005 by energy switchers reported by Wilson and Waddams Price 
(2010, see above) 
 
Comparing household characteristics of metering categories 
Two key influences of whether households save money when adopting a meter are the 
levels of the unmetered and metered bills. These are determined by the rateable value of the 
property concerned and the household’s water consumption respectively. As would be 
expected, the households in this sample differ according to both these ‘characteristics’.  
 
The average rateable value for optant households is £200 per year whereas for compulsory 
households it is £171.5 This underpins why optant households save more money when 
switching to metered charges – because the higher rateable value of their properties causes 
                                                 
4
 The comparisons between all of these groups are statistically significantly different from one another at 
a 1% level or better.  
5
 These values are statistically significantly different from one another at a 1% level of significance. 
them to have higher unmetered water bills which they switch away from. In addition, optant 
households have a notably lower level of consumption than compulsory households - 76 m3 
per annum compared to 115 m3 per annum. 6 These descriptive statistics support the 
expectation that the types of households choosing to be metered will have higher rateable 
values and/or lower consumption than unmetered households.  
 
Warnings about selection bias with a choice of metering  
The choice of optional metering for water consumers has the scope to introduce inefficient 
take-up of metering if unmetered charges do not proxy the household’s consumption levels. 
Rajah and Smith (1993) explain that “systems of non-measured charges which do not 
approximate the payments which households would make if charged for their consumption, 
will tend to encourage some inefficient metering take-up by households whose non-metered 
charge is high relative to current consumption, and also an equally inefficient failure to adopt 
metering by households which would reduce their consumption if metered, but which pay 
very low non-metered charges” (p.92).  Essentially, the current arrangements for meter 
choice may ‘be encouraging exactly the wrong households to choose to be metered’ (Cowan 
2010, p.813). If such ‘tariff’ choice is to be retained in an uncontested market in the future, 
there is scope to improve the choice process so that more efficient adoption of metering is 
achieved. This would be consistent with Ofwat’s sustainability objectives in terms of 
encouraging more efficient use of water resources.  
 
UK and International Water Consumer Perceptions and Bill Engagement 
Recent research presented in Gardner (2010) explores how accurate UK water consumer 
perceptions are for certain aspects of bills and charging. This is relevant to how consumers 
may behave given (uncontested or contested) choice in this market. Specifically, the 
evidence suggests that bill-related consumer perceptions are relatively inaccurate. This may 
have implications for the quality of tariff choices made by consumers and indeed how likely 
they are to engage in the ‘market’. 
 
Perception Accuracy  
The research conducted explored the accuracy of consumers’ bill, price and consumption 
perceptions. For a full discussion of the sample used and its representativeness the reader 
is referred to Gardner (2010).  
 
                                                 
6
 These values are statistically significantly different from one another at a 1% level of significance. 
Consumer’s perceptions of the unit price of water were strikingly inaccurate – the price of a 
cubic meter of water was overestimated by 458% (the median price perception was 
overestimated by 567%). No directly comparable results are available in other international 
studies but Carter and Milon (2005) and Martins and Fortunato (2007) found a minority of 
respondents (6% and 20% respectively) claimed to know the unit price of water.  
 
Interestingly, respondents had more accurate perceptions of their quarterly water bill than 
water prices: on average bills were overestimated by 65% (the median perception was -4% 
but only for a very small portion of the sample). These perceptions are significantly more 
accurate than price perceptions. This accords with the finding in Whitcomb (1999) that 63% 
of respondents stated they knew their total bill amount.  
 
With respect to tariff perceptions, only 26% of respondents were able to correctly state which 
of two tariffs they were on (flat or increasing block). This is notably worse than if consumers 
had randomly chosen between the two alternatives, and raises the possibility of systematic 
tariff structure misunderstanding among consumers. These findings echo other studies 
which find that only between 18% and 50% of consumers are aware of the price structure 
they face (Young et al., 1983; Agthe et al., 1988; Energy Saving Trust, 2008). 
 
With respect to consumption perceptions, the mean daily consumption in litres was 
underestimated by 29% (median perceptions were more inaccurate, underestimated by 70% 
-75%). The mean perception of quarterly cubic meter consumption was overestimated by 
626% (however, the median perception was only underestimated by 0.65% which suggests 
that the nearly 5% of the sample that formed the median had very accurate perceptions or 
that they consulted their bill when answering the question).  
 
In comparison to international evidence, consumption perceptions in this UK sample are very 
inaccurate. The most inaccurate were of quarterly cubic meter consumption, ranging from 
underestimates of 94% to overestimates of 9835%. Even the more accurate daily litre 
perceptions ranged from underestimates of 99% to overestimates of 813%.  In contrast, Van 
Vuuren et al. (2004) find a range from underestimates of 44% to overestimates of 63% for 
South African water consumers. Previous studies which asked people whether they knew 
their consumption level found between less than half or a quarter did (Whitcomb 1999; 
Catenazzo et al., 2008). The new evidence for UK consumers is consistent with the lower 
end of this range.  
 
Of the perceptions discussed here the most accurate (or least inaccurate) perceptions were 
of the total bill amount. This was only overestimated by 65% while unit price perceptions 
were overestimated by 458% on average. The relative accuracy of these perceptions raises 
the possibility that consumers do not respond directly to unit prices, but rather respond 
indirectly to price changes as perceived via their total bill amount. This may have 
implications for tariff choice in an uncontested water market if consumers are unable and/or 
unwilling to engage with the constituent parts of their water bill. For example, they may not 
be able to calculate whether a switch to a different tariff structure will increase or decrease 
their bill. This, combined with loss aversion, may act as a disincentive for consumers to 
exercise choice in this market. 
 
Engagement with Bills 
As part of this investigation of consumer perceptions, how consumers engage with their bill 
was also explored, though no comparative international evidence is available in this area. 
Survey respondents were asked which aspects of their bill they look at. Very few consumers 
(only 15%) look at the price of water while less than half (44%) look at consumption. The 
vast majority (77%) look at total amount owed.7 These behaviours mirror the relative 
accuracy of perceptions discussed above- the total bill amount, consumption and price are 
both the most consulted and most accurately perceived aspects of the bill respectively.  
 
Customers were also asked in how much detail they looked at their bill: 7.5% do not look at 
all, 46% skim it and 40% look in detail.8 When asked how easy it was to understand their 
water bill, 16% of consumers found it ‘very easy’ while a majority of 49% found it ‘quite easy’. 
Only 7% of consumers found their bill ‘very hard’ to understand and 17% found it ‘quite hard’. 
The remainder did not answer this question. While the majority of consumers found their bills 
quite or very easy to understand, consideration could be given to how to make bills more 
accessible to customers. This is particularly important if tariff choice is to be facilitated as 
consumers need to be able to engage with their bill (and information relating to new tariffs) to 
make appropriate decisions. In addition, which groups of customers find their bills very or 
quite hard to understand could also be explored, particularly to see whether these groups 
include a disproportionate number of vulnerable customers. If so, this raises the possibility 
that such groups might find it difficult to engage in tariff choices – see the discussion in the 
previous section.  
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 These answer categories were not mutually exclusive.  
8
 These categories do not sum to 100% because of missing data.  
6. When are optional tariffs likely to be beneficial? What are the challenges and 
potential solutions?  
Introduction of optional metering will certainly benefit companies (if they behave rationally 
and introduce them only if they increase profits) and is likely to benefit some consumers. If 
these are the 20% who are found to benefit from better deals in energy because they have 
the ability and motivation to be active in the market, does it matter if the other 80% are no 
better off? Is the regulator comfortable with a change which makes companies and ‘savvy’ 
consumers better off, but does not have any effect on the majority of consumers?  
 
Is choice always positive? Will presenting additional options reduce the welfare of 
consumers who feel they may be confused by the choice, and anxious about deciding well 
for themselves? How does this sit with Ofwat’s statutory duties for the interests of some 
groups of consumers? 
 
How are these decisions likely to be affected by the behaviour of the companies, and what 
would Ofwat’s role be in regulating them? Evidence from several markets shows that 
companies are much more effective at communicating with consumers than are regulators 
(see for example Garrod et al., 2009), but their motives are different. Will there be a 
tendency for them to promote tariffs which are not necessarily the best for the consumers 
concerned? Do consumers have access to impartial advice that they can trust, and will they 
take it? Price comparison websites, which are an important aid to activity in contested 
markets, are unlikely to be available in an uncontested market.  The framing of the options 
and the role of the default tariff will be crucial, as the current debate in energy shows. 
 
What regulatory intervention would be necessary to ensure the best outcome for individual 
consumers, for the consumer group as a whole and for the industry? What role would 
consumer groups play, and would all potential outcomes be acceptable? 
 
One consideration to take into account is that much of the economic analysis of when a 
change is beneficial is based on an expansion in demand, which is seen to be positive in 
most markets because more consumers are served. In water (and other markets where the 
price may not reflect the full resource cost) this particular argument may not be applicable. 
 
Much of the literature which supports the proposal that tariff choice can increase welfare is 
based on the presumption that consumers make good choices (or engage with the market at 
all). We have provided evidence that this is often not the case.  
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